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[1645] 
Corporate Codes of Conduct: 
Binding Contract or Ideal Publicity? 
Haley Revak* 
Over the last twenty years, most multi-national corporations have adopted corporate 
codes of conduct, partially due to incentives from the U.S. government. These self-
imposed ethical credos set out basic policy standards to guide employees and officers, but 
they also serve to assure consumers that the products they purchase come from a 
principled organization. But as of yet, there has been no successful suit against a multi-
national corporation for violations of its code. Are these codes then nothing more than 
government-sanctioned golden publicity? Through the recent Doe v. Wal-Mart Stores, 
Inc. suit, this Note analyzes whether corporate codes of conduct are legally binding with 
regard to human rights violations at foreign supplier factories. After considering contract 
and tort theories of liability, as well as potential actions for violation of international 
treaties and false advertising, it remains unclear whether corporations can be legally held 
to their ethical claims. Ultimately, it may be most effective to look beyond the law—and 
the corporate code of conduct—in order to achieve justice for victims of human rights 
abuses abroad. 
 
 * J.D., University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2012. Thank you to Professor 
Charles L. Knapp for providing the opportunity to explore to this topic. I am especially grateful to my 
family for their constant support. Above all, thank you to Michael for being the best part of every day. 
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Introduction 
Corporations are not responsible for all the world’s problems, nor do 
they have the resources to solve them all. . . . [but], a well-run 
business . . . can have a greater impact on social good than any other 
institution or philanthropic organization.1 
Since the early 1990s, large U.S. corporations have adopted corporate 
codes of conduct. It is unclear, however, whether these self-imposed 
ethical protocols are anything more than publicity gold, with no legal 
efficacy. If these codes are not legally binding, there is no way to hold a 
corporation responsible for ethical violations—such as human rights 
abuses committed at foreign supply plants. This Note will utilize the recent 
Doe v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. suit as a lens to investigate whether corporate 
codes of conduct are legally binding under either a third-party beneficiary 
contract or a negligent undertaking tort framework. This Note will also 
examine other means of holding corporations accountable for their actions 
abroad, including the use of international treaties, false advertising claims, 
and proactive national legislation. Ultimately, while the binding nature of 
 
 1. Michael E. Porter & Mark R. Kramer, Strategy and Society: The Link Between Competitive 
Advantage and Corporate Social Responsibility, Harv. Bus. Rev., Dec. 2006, at 78, 92. 
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corporate codes of conduct may be unsettled legally, holding 
corporations accountable for all levels of their supply chain is a 
worthwhile objective—whether we use a corporate code, a vote, or our 
dollar to achieve it. 
I.  DOE V. WAL-MART STORES, INC. 
In 2005, workers in Wal-Mart suppliers’ factories in China, 
Bangladesh, Indonesia, Swaziland, and Nicaragua, and employees of 
Wal-Mart’s competitors in Southern California, filed a class action suit 
against the retail chain.2 The plaintiffs alleged breach of contract as third-
party beneficiaries (or Wal-Mart as joint employer in the alternative), 
negligence, unjust enrichment, violation of California’s Unfair 
Competition Law (“UCL”), and violation of the Alien Tort Statute 
(“ATS”).3 The plaintiffs contended that Wal-Mart failed to enforce its 
Standards for Suppliers code of conduct (“Standards”), which required 
foreign suppliers to adhere to local laws and industry standards regarding 
working conditions such as wages, hours worked, forced labor, child 
labor, and discrimination.4 As a result, the foreign plaintiffs suffered from 
poor working conditions that included excessive hours or days of work, 
withheld pay, overtime without pay, pay below minimum wage, denial of 
overtime pay, failure to provide required rest periods, lack of safety 
equipment, denial of maternity benefits, discrimination because of union 
activities, and physical abuse.5 The California plaintiffs lost pay and 
benefits because their employers were placed at an unfair disadvantage 
and were forced to reduce compensation in order to compete with Wal-
Mart.6 
On April 2, 2007, the district court granted with leave to amend 
Wal-Mart’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.7 Only the 
foreign plaintiffs appealed,8 and the Ninth Circuit subsequently upheld 
the district court’s decision on July 10, 2009.9 The Ninth Circuit found 
 
 2. First Amended Class Action Complaint for Injunctive Relief and Damages, Doe v. Wal-Mart 
Stores, Inc., No. CV 05-07307-NM(MANx), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98102, (C.D. Cal. Dec. 28, 2005), 
ECF No. 19 [hereinafter Complaint]. 
 3. Id. at 1–2. See 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2010); Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 (West 2011). 
 4. Complaint, supra note 2, at 1–2. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Doe v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. CV 05-7307 AG (MANx), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98102, 
at *22 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2007). 
 8. Instead of amending, the plaintiffs appealed. See Appellee’s Answering Brief at 2–3, Doe v. 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. CV 05-7307 AG (C.D. Cal. 2008) (No. 08-55706). Because no final 
judgment had been issued, however, the parties stipulated to dismiss the plaintiffs’ appeal. Id. The 
parties returned to district court and further stipulated that the April 2, 2007, order granting Wal-
Mart’s motion to dismiss was a final judgment, enabling the plaintiffs to appeal. See id.; see also Doe v. 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 680 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 9. Doe v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d at 680. 
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that the employees’ third-party beneficiary claim failed because Wal-
Mart made no promise to monitor the suppliers, and thus no such 
promise or contractual duty flowed to their employees.10 The joint 
employer claim also failed because the supply contract terms did not 
entail a sufficient level of day-to-day control over the suppliers’ 
employees to make Wal-Mart the plaintiffs’ employer.11 Additionally, the 
court rejected each of the negligence theories—third-party beneficiary 
negligence, negligent retention of control, negligent undertaking, and 
common law negligence—because Wal-Mart did not owe the employees 
a legal duty to monitor its suppliers or prevent the alleged intentional 
mistreatment of the suppliers’ employees.12 Finally, the court held that 
the unjust enrichment claim failed because the connection between the 
parties was too attenuated where there was no prior relationship 
between the foreign employees and Wal-Mart.13 
II.  Wal-Mart’s Foreign Suppliers and the  
Standards for Suppliers 
A. Standards for Suppliers 
Wal-Mart’s Standards is a component of its Ethical Sourcing 
Program established in 1992 that aims to “strengthen the implementation 
of positive labor and environmental practices in factories [and] to bring 
opportunities for a better life in the countries where merchandise for sale 
by Wal-Mart is sourced.”14 The company is “committed to working with 
[its] suppliers and other stakeholders to accomplish these objectives.”15 
The Standards outline Wal-Mart’s “fundamental expectations from 
its suppliers regarding their activities in relation to the workers producing 
merchandise for sale by Walmart and the impact of their manufacturing 
practices on the environment.”16 The Standards contain eleven sections. 
Part One requires that suppliers comply with all “national and/or local 
laws” related to “labor, immigration, health and safety, and the 
environment.”17 Part Two, “Voluntary Labor,” prohibits child, “forced, 
bonded, prison, or indentured labor.”18 Part Three, “Hiring and 
 
 10. Id. at 682. 
 11. Id. at 683. 
 12. Id. at 684. 
 13. Id. at 685. 
 14. Ethical Sourcing, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (Dec. 18, 2010), http://web.archive.org/web/ 
20101218174108/http://walmartstores.com/AboutUs/279.aspx (accessed using the Internet Archive 
index). 
 15. Id. 
 16. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., Standards for Suppliers (2009) [hereinafter Standards for 
Suppliers]. Wal-Mart issued a new version of the Standards in 2012, but the references throughout this 
Note are to the 2009 version that was in place at the time of the Doe suit. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
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Employment Practices,” requires that all terms and conditions of 
employment, including “hiring, pay, promotion, termination, and 
retirement,” be based on a worker’s “ability and willingness to do the 
job.”19 Part Four specifies that suppliers must remunerate workers with 
“wages, overtime premiums, and benefits that meet or exceed local legal 
standards or collective agreements, whichever are higher.”20 Part Five 
orders suppliers to permit workers to join or form labor unions, and Part 
Six mandates that suppliers must provide a “safe and healthy work 
environment” and take “proactive measures to prevent workplace 
hazards.”21 The remaining sections of the Standards discuss the suppliers’ 
obligation to comply with environmental regulations, avoid conflicts of 
interest, and ensure financial integrity and a lack of corruption.22 The 
final paragraph of the Standards includes contact information to report 
violations, which can be communicated confidentially in a local 
language.23 Individuals are encouraged to report issues via the provided 
email address, website, or telephone hotline.24 
The ethics violation reporting website25 links visitors to the 
“Statement of Ethics,” a global policy in force in each of Wal-Mart’s 
locations. The Statement of Ethics is available to download in several 
languages and applies to third parties such as suppliers, requiring them to 
“act ethically and in a manner consistent with this Statement of Ethics.”26 
Much of the language of the document, however, addresses Wal-Mart’s 
own employees, requiring Wal-Mart associates to comply “fully with all 
applicable federal, state, and local laws and regulations pertaining to wage-
and-hour issues,” including “off-the-clock work, meal and rest breaks, 
overtime pay, termination pay, minimum-wage requirements, [and] wages 
and hours of minors.”27 
B. Process to Become a Supplier 
International suppliers must contact their local Wal-Mart Global 
Procurement office in order to supply goods for sale in Wal-Mart stores.28 
 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Walmart Global Ethics Office, http://www.walmartethics.com/home.aspx (last visited July 
1, 2012).  
 26. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., Statement of Ethics 6 (2008). 
 27. Id. at 13. 
 28. See Become a Supplier: Proposal Packet, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., http://walmartstores.com/ 
Suppliers/250.aspx (last visited July 1, 2012) [hereinafter Proposal Packet]; Press Release, Wal-Mart 
Stores, Inc., Wal-Mart Opens Office to Encourage U.S. Exports of American-Made Goods (Feb. 14, 
2003), available at http://walmartstores.com/pressroom/news/4497.aspx. 
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For this purpose, the Global Procurement Program has regional offices 
in seventeen countries.29 
Once registered with the Global Procurement Program, a vendor can 
provide a product submission to be reviewed by Wal-Mart buyers.30 If the 
product is accepted, the foreign supplier is required to sign a “legally 
binding agreement,” which includes contract terms that detail “allowances, 
new store discounts, merchandise warranties, defective/return merchandise 
allowances, warehouse allowances, soft goods allowances, late shipment 
penalties and markdown dollars or discounts.”31 Wal-Mart suppliers must 
also sign the Standards, acknowledging they have read and accept the 
terms and further acknowledging that any failure to comply with the code 
of conduct may result in Wal-Mart’s immediate cancellation of all orders 
and refusal to continue to do business with the supplier.32 The code of 
conduct is intended to apply to suppliers both nationally and 
internationally.33 However, it is unclear whether assent to the Standards is 
a component of a “legally binding” framework for future Wal-Mart orders. 
III.  Wal-Mart: Not Just Any Defendant 
A. Wal-Mart and Its Legal Battles 
Headquartered in Bentonville, Arkansas, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. is a 
publicly traded company and the world’s largest retailer.34 With over ten 
thousand stores in twenty-seven countries and over 2.2 million 
employees,35 Wal-Mart’s 2011 revenue exceeded $420 billion with over 
$16 billion in profits.36 Wal-Mart ranks number two on Forbes’ Fortune 
500 (making it America’s second largest company),37 and welcomes more 
than one-hundred million customers into its U.S. stores each week—
nearly a third of the U.S. population.38 
Since its founding in 1962, Wal-Mart has faced significant criticism 
for its treatment of employees, its anti-union stance, discrimination 
 
 29. Press Release, supra note 28. 
 30. Proposal Packet, supra note 28.  
 31. Become a Supplier: Requirements, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., http://walmartstores.com/ 
Suppliers/248.aspx (last visited July 1, 2010). 
 32. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., Ethical Sourcing: Standards for Suppliers Manual 18–19 (2009) 
[hereinafter Manual]. Wal-Mart issued a new version of the Manual in 2012, but the references 
throughout this Note are to the 2009 version that was in place at the time of the Doe suit. 
 33. Id. at 5. 
 34. Complaint, supra note 2, at 13. 
 35. See About Us, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., http://www.walmartstores.com/aboutus/ (last visited 
July 1, 2012). 
 36. See Key Walmart Stores, Inc.: Financials, Hoover’s, http://www.hoovers.com/company/Wal-
Mart_Stores_Inc/rrjiff-1-1nji3j-1njhft.html (last visited July 1, 2012). 
 37. Deloitte, Switching Channels: Global Powers of Retailing 2012, at G11 (Jan. 2012). 
 38. See Ann Zimmerman & Kris Hudson, Managing Wal-Mart: How U.S.-Store Chief Hopes to 
Fix Wal-Mart, Wall St. J., Apr. 17, 2006. 
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against women and minorities, predatory pricing, environmental policies, 
and foreign product sourcing, among other practices.39 As a result, in 
2005 labor unions established several watchdog organizations to 
influence public opinion against Wal-Mart, including Wake Up Wal-
Mart (United Food and Commercial Workers) and Wal-Mart Watch 
(Service Employees International Union).40 
Wal-Mart was also recently embroiled in a sexual discrimination 
lawsuit, the largest class action suit of its kind in U.S. history.41 Filed in 
2000, the suit alleged that Wal-Mart discriminated against women in 
promotion, pay, and job assignment decisions in violation of Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.42 In June 2004, the district court certified the 
class which included 1.5 million women who work or have worked at a 
Wal-Mart store since December 28, 1998.43 The Ninth Circuit affirmed 
the certification in 2007 and again in 2010 by an en banc panel.44 Wal-
Mart petitioned the Supreme Court, which in June 2011 decertified the 
class on the grounds that it lacked commonality because it was 
impossible for the plaintiffs to prove that every single woman was the 
victim of sex discrimination.45 The class was also rejected for attempting 
to certify a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 23(b)(2) injunctive 
relief class while at the same time seeking Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure Rule 23(b)(3) money damages for back pay.46 
As both a deep-pocketed target for lawsuits and an aggressive 
defender of its rights, Wal-Mart is constantly involved in litigation. Legal 
analysts believe Wal-Mart is sued more often than any American entity 
except the U.S. government, and juries decide a case in which Wal-Mart 
is a defendant about six times every business day.47 According to its most 
recent quarterly filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission, 
Wal-Mart is a party in “a number” of suits that include a wage-and-hour 
 
 39. See, e.g., Marcus Kabel, Gloves Come off as Wal-Mart, Critics Slam Each Other on Web, USA 
Today (Jul. 18, 2006, 6:18 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/2006-07-18-wal-mart-web_x.htm. 
 40. See Wake Up Wal-Mart (Dec. 1, 2010), http://web.archive.org/web/20101201012047/ 
http://wakeupwalmart.com/about (accessed using the Internet Archive index); Wal-Mart Watch 
(Jan. 18, 2006), http://web.archive.org/web/20060118030123/http://walmartwatch.com/home/pages/ 
about (accessed using the Internet Archive index).  
 41. See James Vicini, Wal-Mart Class-Action Appeal Goes to Supreme Court, Reuters (Dec. 6, 2010), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/12/07/us-walmart-lawsuit-discrimination-idUSTRE6B531W20101207. 
 42. Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137, 144 (N.D. Cal. 2004). 
 43. Id. at 141, 164.  
 44. Dukes v. Wal-Mart, Inc., 474 F.3d 1214, 1222 (9th Cir. 2007), aff’d en banc, 603 F.3d 571, 577 
(9th Cir. 2010). 
 45. See Daniel Fisher, Supreme Court Dumps Wal-Mart Sex-Discrimination Class Action, Forbes 
(June 20, 2011), http://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/2011/06/20/supreme-court-dumps-wal-mart-
sex-discrimination-class-action. 
 46. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2557–59 (2011). 
 47. See Richard Willing, Lawsuits a Volume Business at Wal-Mart, USA Today (Aug. 13, 2001, 
11:51 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2001/08/14/walmart-usat.htm. 
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class action, gender discrimination cases, and hazardous materials 
investigations.48 Wal-Mart is also notorious for its refusal to settle cases.49 
With regard to Wal-Mart’s foreign labor practices, perhaps the most 
(in)famous event was the public scandal involving television host Kathie 
Lee Gifford. In 1996, the human rights group National Labor Committee 
reported that factories were using sweatshop labor to make the clothes 
for the Kathie Lee line sold at Wal-Mart stores.50 A worker in Honduras 
smuggled a garment out of a factory, which included a Kathie Lee label 
on it, and another worker came to the United States to testify about the 
factory’s working conditions.51 During an episode of Live! With Regis and 
Kathie Lee, Gifford publicly disclaimed any involvement with the day-to-
day management of the factories and vowed to establish an independent 
monitoring program for all of the factories producing her clothing.52 
President Clinton subsequently appointed her to the White House 
Apparel Industry Partnership Task Force, part of the Clinton 
Administration’s effort to require some of the best-known brands to 
begin putting disclaimers on clothing to assure buyers that children were 
not exploited in the manufacture of those clothes.53 
B. Wal-Mart’s Response to Criticism 
In response to the accusations that it is an “unrepentant and recidivist 
violator of human rights,”54 Wal-Mart implemented several measures to 
prevent workers’ rights violations in its supplier factories.55 One such 
measure is the Standards code of conduct, developed in 1992 and intended 
to apply to all suppliers.56 The code of conduct is incorporated into its 
supply contracts, and as a part of its public representations, Wal-Mart 
promises to do business exclusively with suppliers who are in compliance 
with the Standards.57 Compliance with the Standards is imposed and 
 
 48. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., Form 10-Q: Quarterly Report for the Quarterly Period Ended 
April 30, 2012, at 13–14 (2012). 
 49. See What You Should Know About Suing Wal-Mart, Wal-Mart Litigation Project (Mar. 25, 
2010), http://web.archive.org/web/20100325215625/http://www.wal-martlitigation.com/know.htm (accessed 
using the Internet Archive index); Willing, supra note 47. 
 50. See Lynne Duke, The Man Who Made Kathie Lee Cry, Wash. Post, July 31, 2005, at D1. 
 51. See Videotape: Zoned for Slavery: The Child Behind the Label, (Nat’l Labor Com. 1995); see 
also Charles Bowden, Keeper of the Fire, MotherJones, July/Aug. 2003 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Complaint, supra note 2, at 13. 
 55. This was also likely a reaction to the 1991 enactment of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, which 
provided monetary incentives and mitigated future liability for companies that instituted ethics 
programs, including codes of conduct. See Corporate Codes of Conduct, International Labour 
Organization Bureau for Workers’ Activities, http://actrav.itcilo.org/actrav-english/telearn/global/ 
ilo/code/main.htm (last visited July 1, 2010); U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 8 (2010). 
 56. Complaint, supra note 2, at 14. 
 57. See Manual, supra note 32, at 2–3 (“If a factory fails to meet its required or permitted levels, 
then the factory will be asked to provide a remediation plan to improve compliance performance so 
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monitored by the Global Procurement Division from the company’s 
headquarters, with regional offices tasked with implementing the policies 
and practices to ensure uniformity for all Wal-Mart suppliers in Asia, 
Africa, and Latin America.58 Moreover, Wal-Mart’s Standards for 
Suppliers Manual (“Manual”) requires that the Standards be posted at 
“each factory producing Walmart’s merchandise in the local language or 
languages as a mechanism to communicate with the workers Walmart’s 
expectations from its suppliers and their factories producing Walmart’s 
merchandise.”59 
In concert with the Standards, Wal-Mart reserves the right to 
inspect foreign suppliers to ensure they are in compliance with the code 
of conduct. The introduction to the 2009 Manual asserts that Wal-Mart 
will “audit . . . factories regularly.”60 The Manual goes on to clarify that 
the relevant Global Procurement Overseas Field Office is responsible for 
executing the Ethical Standards Program (“ESP”) for all Direct Import 
Suppliers, and that audits covering “100% of all [m]erchandise” will be 
conducted by “WalMart approved 3rd party audit firms.”61 Further, all 
audits after the initial audit will be unannounced.62 
The audit consists of a factory tour, a minimum of twenty-five 
employee interviews, and review of factory documents.63 The auditor 
then assigns one of four ESP assessment ratings to the factory: (1) Green: 
no or low-risk violations—follow-up audit within two years; (2) Yellow: 
medium-risk violations—follow-up audit within one year; (3) Orange: 
high-risk violations—follow-up audit within six months or disapproved 
from last audit date if third Orange rating in two years; or (4) Red: 
serious violations—one strike against the factory.64 
Wal-Mart enforces its Standards through a “Three Strikes Policy.” 
The first strike from a Red rating results in the cancellation of all current 
and future orders with the supplier’s factory.65 If there is a second strike 
within two years of the first, all current and future orders are cancelled, 
and the supplier must conduct an independent third-party audit at its 
own expense and receive a higher audit assessment.66 After a third strike, 
Wal-Mart may terminate its business relationship with the supplier.67 
 
that it meets or exceeds allowable limits. Failure to improve environmental performance will result in 
a factory being banned from producing merchandise for sale by Walmart.”). 
 58. See Complaint, supra note 2, at 15. 
 59. Manual, supra note 32, at 5. 
 60. Id. at 2. 
 61. Id. at 28. 
 62. Id. at 47. 
 63. Id. at 35–36. 
 64. Id. at 38–39. 
 65. Id. at 40. 
 66. Id. at 40–41. 
 67. Id. at 41. 
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From September 2010 to August 2011, Wal-Mart also instituted a 
new web-based training program for Chinese suppliers.68 The monthly 
webinars were intended to supplement existing training and were 
directed at “manufacturers trying to improve their Walmart audit ratings 
and factory productivity.”69 At its inception, the training program was 
only directed at specific Chinese factories that manufacture products for 
Wal-Mart stores, although in the future the training webinars will be 
offered to additional countries.70 
Wal-Mart has publicized its goal of sourcing 95% of its merchandise 
from factories receiving the highest ESP rating by 2012.71 In order to 
achieve this objective, Wal-Mart increased the use of third-party auditors 
to focus its attention on a Supplier Development Program (“SDP”) 
aimed at helping suppliers understand and apply responsible sourcing in 
their factories.72 While the plaintiffs in Doe asserted that at most only 8% 
of Wal-Mart audits in 2004 were unannounced, this figure may have 
significantly increased in recent years because Wal-Mart shifted a 
majority of its field auditing responsibility to third parties in 2009.73 
Moreover, the SDP has helped 564 supplier factories (12% of Wal-
Mart’s direct import product volume) improve from an Orange to a 
Green or Yellow rating.74 However, this improvement does not discount 
the possibility that workers are coached on the answers to give audit 
inspectors, who in turn are pressured to produce positive reports of 
factories not actually in compliance with the Standards.75 
IV.  Contractual Obligation of the Standards for Suppliers 
A. Contract Formation 
Traditional contract formation requires mutual assent: an offer and 
an acceptance. While mutual assent is typically achieved by each party 
making a promise, it can be conveyed by the parties beginning or 
rendering performance.76 According to the Restatement (Second) of 
 
 68. Supplier Training Program, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (May 20, 2011), http://web.archive.org/web/ 
20110520084754/http://walmartstores.com/Suppliers/10337.aspx (accessed using the Internet Archive index). 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Manual, supra note 32, at 48. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Complaint, supra note 2, at 16; Walmart, Global Sustainability Report 2010 Progress 
Update 20 (2010) [hereinafter Global Sustainability Report]. This was likely a reaction to the 
negative publicity from the Doe v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. suit. 
 74. Global Sustainability Report, supra note 73, at 20. 
 75. Complaint, supra note 2, at 26 (“[I]n 2003, the PT Busanaremaja Agracipta Factory Manager 
ordered Plaintiff John Doe III, and other workers, to inform Wal-Mart inspectors, if asked, that they 
do not work much overtime, and that their leave is properly paid.”). 
 76. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 18 (1981) (“Manifestation of mutual assent to an 
exchange requires that each party either make a promise or begin or render a performance.”); see also 
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Contracts section 18, determining whether Wal-Mart’s Standards is 
contractually binding between Wal-Mart and its suppliers’ employees will 
hinge upon whether the Standards (1) made “a promise clear enough for 
an offer;” (2) was communicated in a way that foreign supplier employees 
knew of its contents and reasonably relied on it; and (3) whether these 
“employees accepted the offer either by commencing or continuing to 
work.”77 
Beginning with the second prong, Wal-Mart required the 
dissemination of the Standards to a degree that foreign employees should 
have known its contents. Suppliers were obligated to post a copy of the 
Standards in factories, and the poster version was translated into twenty-
five languages for this purpose.78 In this respect, the complaint in Doe 
alleged that all of the plaintiffs either “saw posted in the supplier factory 
or were otherwise made aware” of the Standards, and one of the 
Indonesian plaintiffs was required to distribute copies of the Standards in 
his role as a foreman.79 Swaziland plaintiff Jane Doe VII saw the 
Standards posted in the factory where she worked and “understood that 
the worker rights provisions contained therein were for her direct 
benefit.”80 In this manner, the plaintiffs in Doe successfully alleged the 
second prong of contract formation. Similarly, plaintiffs likely met their 
burden on the third prong because all of the plaintiffs continue to work 
in Wal-Mart supplier factories, and their performance constitutes 
“acceptance” of the offer.81 
The most ambiguous component of contract formation between 
Wal-Mart and its vendors’ employees is the first prong: whether Wal-
Mart made a promise sufficient to constitute an offer.82 Courts often 
analyze codes of conduct for general or specific terms, and the 
prevalence of general statements of company policy weighs against 
formation. Because of this, the Standards are probably not a promise 
clear enough to constitute an offer. For one, failure to comply with the 
Standards is not an automatic bar from being a Wal-Mart supplier, and 
poorly rated factories have several opportunities to take remedial 
measures in order to continue doing business with Wal-Mart. Instead, the 
 
Morton v. Hewitt, 202 F. Supp. 2d 394, 396 (D. V.I. 2002) (3d Cir. 2003) (although contractor did not 
immediately accept homeowners’ offer, he effectively accepted when he began construction work on 
the homes and an enforceable agreement was created when he completed the work). 
 77. Katherine E. Kenny, Code or Contract: Whether Wal-Mart’s Code of Conduct Creates a 
Contractual Obligation Between Wal-Mart and the Employees of its Foreign Suppliers, 27 Nw. J. Int’l 
L. & Bus. 453, 463 (2007). 
 78. See id. 
 79. Complaint, supra note 2, at 26, 35. 
 80. Id. at 26. 
 81. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 18. 
 82. See Atlantic Pebble Co. v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., 98 A. 410, 412 (N.J. 1916) (finding that, 
where a promise is in effect an offer contemplating acceptance by performance of a condition, 
performance of the condition before withdrawal of the offer gives rise to a valid contract). 
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Standards is merely a list of the types of conduct that may result in 
disciplinary action. Moreover, several of the sections fail to define terms 
or enumerate consequences. For example, the “Voluntary Labor” 
section says that “[c]hild, forced, bonded, prison, or indentured labor will 
not be tolerated,” but it does not describe those violations or what 
remedial actions Wal-Mart may take in response.83 Thus, a court will 
likely find the Standards does not contain an offer, and its content is 
better classified as “general statements of company policy and guidelines 
for employer-employee conduct.”84 
Wal-Mart could also successfully argue that it did not intend the 
Standards to confer rights on workers but rather to serve as notice to its 
suppliers of the types of conduct that could result in Wal-Mart’s 
unilateral termination of a contract. Accordingly, the code of conduct 
should not be read as contractually binding in the context of “Voluntary 
Labor,” “but should merely be seen as non-contractual guidelines for 
suppliers to follow.”85 In its answer, Wal-Mart asserted a version of this 
argument, claiming that it obtained a “right to monitor the suppliers for 
its own benefit, not for the benefit of the suppliers or plaintiffs.”86 For 
these reasons, courts have historically been reluctant to find corporate 
codes of conduct to be enforceable contracts, as was the case in Doe v. 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.87 
B. German Code of Conduct Dispute 
Courts thus far have generally been disinclined to find a code of 
conduct to be an implied contract—much less an express contract—
between a corporation and its employees.88 However, a 2005 court ruling 
in Germany sheds light on Wal-Mart’s own view of the binding nature of 
a similar code of conduct on its employees. 
 
 83. Standards for Suppliers, supra note 16. 
 84. Kenny, supra note 77, at 464. See, e.g., Campbell v. City of Champaign, 940 F.2d 1111, 1112 
(7th Cir. 1991) (finding that, when the purpose of an employee handbook is not to confer rights, but to 
warn employees about conduct that will result in termination, the handbook does not constitute a 
contract); Weber Shandwick Worldwide v. Reid, No. 05 C 709, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14482, at *12–13 
(N.D. Ill. 2005) (finding that a code of conduct containing no clear promissory language is merely a 
guide for the standards of conduct expected of an employee); Czarnecki v. Claypool, No. 98 C 2908, 
2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5647, at *10–13 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (finding that a handbook containing language 
that merely gives examples of the types of conduct that can lead to discharge does not amount to a 
contractual promise); Vickers v. Abbott Lab., 719 N.E.2d 1101, 1113–14 (Ill. App. 1999) (finding that 
general statements of company policy or practice are too indefinite to create a binding promise). 
 85. Kenny, supra note 77, at 466. 
 86. Appellee’s Answering Brief, supra note 8, at 9. 
 87. See, e.g., Day v. Staples, Inc., 555 F.3d 42, 58 (1st Cir. 2009); Hinchey v. NYNEX Corp., 144 
F.3d 134, 141–42 (1st Cir. 1998); King v. Marriot Int’l, Inc., 520 F. Supp. 2d 748, 754 (D. S.C. 2007); see 
also Lord v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 2011 WL 5118534, at *5–6 (D. S.C. 2011). 
 88. See supra notes 84, 87. 
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In 2005, Wal-Mart attached a Code of Conduct to its German 
employees’ paychecks and displayed posters with the same Code in local 
Human Resources departments.89 This Code required employees to 
refrain from intimate relationships with other employees and provided a 
hotline where suspected violations could be reported.90 The Local 
Labour Court of Wuppertal found the Code violated the German 
Constitution and German Labor laws, which require that rules regarding 
employees’ personal lives be agreed upon between employees and 
employers.91 More importantly, this case demonstrates Wal-Mart’s belief 
that its Code of Conduct is binding on its employees, subjecting them to 
possible termination for failure to abide by it.92 This belief in a binding 
obligation suggests a similar intent behind Wal-Mart’s creation of the 
Standards, and it also shows the courts’ view that codes of conduct, 
especially those distributed and displayed to employees, have some 
binding force to them.93 It is important to note, however, that the 
German code of conduct at issue (unlike the Standards) was specifically 
directed at Wal-Mart’s own employees (as opposed to foreign supplier 
employees who are one step removed), contained detailed provisions, 
and warranted termination for non-compliance, allowing it to overcome 
the contract formation hurdles the Doe plaintiffs faced. More 
significantly, while the German courts viewed such a contract as binding 
on employees, it remains unclear whether the obligation to enforce the 
contract is also binding on Wal-Mart. 
V.  Third-Party Beneficiary Contract Claim 
The Ninth Circuit rejected plaintiffs’ third-party beneficiary breach of 
contract claim because Wal-Mart did not adopt a contractual duty to 
inspect supplier factories.94 The language of the Standards did not provide 
for adverse consequences if Wal-Mart failed to monitor suppliers, even 
though the suppliers could be penalized for failing to comply with the code 
of conduct.95 Instead, Wal-Mart merely reserved the right to monitor its 
suppliers. Because Wal-Mart made no promise to monitor suppliers, “no 
such promise flows to Plaintiffs as third-party beneficiaries.”96 
 
 89. See Ronald C. Brown, East Asian Labor and Employment Law: International and 
Comparative Context 169 (2012); see also Ingebjörg Darsow, Implementation of Ethics Codes in 
Germany: The Wal-Mart Case, IUSLabor (Mar. 2005), http://upf.edu/iuslabor/032005/art11.htm. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. Later that year, the Labour Court of Appeal Düsseldorf affirmed the lower court’s 
decision. See Sabine Schmeinck, Germany-Labour Court of Appeal Düsseldorf Confirms Wal-Mart 
Decision, Linklaters (Dec. 14, 2005), http://www.linklaters.com/Publications/Publication1403Newsletter/ 
PublicationIssue20051214/Pages/PublicationIssueItem825.aspx. 
 92. Kenny, supra note 75, at 463. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Doe v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 682 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
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A third-party beneficiary may assert a claim where a “promise in a 
contract creates a duty in the promisor to any intended beneficiary to 
perform the promise.”97 Moreover, an intended beneficiary may only 
make a third-party claim “if recognition of a right to performance in the 
beneficiary is appropriate to effectuate the intention of the parties.”98 
Zigas v. Superior Court qualifies this third-party right to sue in the 
government contract context: Where a government agency is the 
promisee and there are an unlimited number of third-party beneficiaries, 
there must be a clear showing that the contract intended third-party 
beneficiaries or they have no claim.99 This rationale can be extended by 
analogy to apply to buyer-supplier contracts with multi-national 
corporations like Wal-Mart, where potential third-party supplier 
employees could number in the millions. Otherwise, such companies could 
face almost limitless liability from even the most minor contributors to the 
supply chain. 
The Doe court dismissed plaintiffs’ third-party claim due to a lack of 
evidence of the parties’ clear intent to make a legally binding promise to 
monitor supplier factories. Wal-Mart also argued that the plain language 
of the Standards “casts these issues as a right” to monitor, as opposed to 
a promise to do so made by Wal-Mart.100 However, as Wal-Mart’s Ethical 
Sourcing Program develops and the company places a greater emphasis 
on addressing the human rights violations of its suppliers, this may not be 
the case. 
For one, the circumstances surrounding the creation of the 
Standards suggest an intent to benefit foreign workers. Wal-Mart was 
reacting to bad press and needed to assuage the public that it was 
addressing human rights violations in its factories. While the creation of a 
code of conduct may have originally been intended just for Wal-Mart’s 
benefit—that is, to improve public relations—it is unlikely that the 
world’s largest retailer would admit to this. Fear of a public relations 
backlash may also be the reason why corporate codes of conduct do not 
contain disclaimers that would prevent employees from bringing suit on 
the basis of the code’s statements. 
Even if the code of conduct was originally established to benefit the 
company itself, or it sought to serve foreign workers out of selfish 
motives, that should not undercut a third-party beneficiary claim. The 
fact that Wal-Mart required its suppliers to post the Standards in the 
local language in each factory implies Wal-Mart’s desire that foreign 
workers recognize that their factory employers are held to ethical 
 
 97. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 304 (1981). 
 98. Id. § 302(1). 
 99. 174 Cal. Rptr. 806, 811 (1981). 
 100. Reporter’s Transcript of Proceedings at 26:1–2, Doe v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. CV 05-7307 
AG (MANx), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98102 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2006). 
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obligations designed for employee benefit and that violations may be 
directly reported to Wal-Mart. As Wal-Mart advances its goal of sourcing 
95% of its merchandise from compliant factories and works directly with 
factories to improve their policies through the SDP, it becomes more 
difficult to make the claim that factory workers are not the intended 
beneficiaries of these measures based on the various indicia of intent. 
Beyond failing to show Wal-Mart’s intent to benefit foreign 
workers, proving that Wal-Mart breached the Standards was an 
insurmountable obstacle for the Doe plaintiffs.101 It is possible, however, 
to interpret Wal-Mart’s recent efforts as equivalent to Wal-Mart pledging 
to support code compliance by agreeing to monitor and counsel foreign 
suppliers.102 Plaintiffs’ counsel asserted that it would be “certainly 
plausible and a reasonable inference” that suppliers went to Wal-Mart 
claiming that it:  
can’t expect us overnight to suddenly clean up all of our hundreds or 
thousands of factories. If you, Wal-Mart, want us to do this, we want 
you to help us implement and we want you to put some resources in 
this to help us ensure that we’re not losing our contract the day that 
your code of conduct begins.103  
Indeed, the Supplier Development Program is described as a collaborative 
program to work with supplier partners in order to achieve certain social 
and environmental goals.104 
However, there is no mention of the SDP in the Standards agreement 
that requires the suppliers’ assent, and there is little evidence of 
 
 101. The trial court summarily dismissed these “reality-bending allegations,” noting that it “strains 
logic to think that the suppliers would have been motivated to bargain for a counter-promise from 
Defendant to enforce the suppliers’ contractual promise to comply.” Doe v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 
No. CV 05-7307 AG (MANx), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98102, at *11 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2007). 
However, the court did not address the possibility that competition between suppliers for Wal-Mart’s 
lucrative contracts would lead them to seek a reciprocal commitment from Wal-Mart; that way, 
suppliers able to secure contracts with Wal-Mart would not have them immediately revoked because 
sufficient ethical standards were not already in place.  
 102. See Joe Phillips & Suk-Jun Lim, Their Brothers’ Keeper: Global Buyers and the Legal Duty to 
Protect Suppliers’ Employees, 61 Rutgers L. Rev. 333, 371 (2009). 
 103. Reporter’s Transcript, supra note 100, at 7:14–21. Plaintiffs counsel also cites a Wal-Mart 
exhibit that takes credit for having implemented the code of conduct: “Since Wal-Mart started [the 
code of conduct program] . . . in 1992, we have contributed to the improvement of working conditions 
for many thousands of workers in the factories around the world.” Id. at 8:3–6. This suggests that Wal-
Mart made a promise that was bargained for because “if you’re a supplier in China and you are cut to 
the margins—because that’s what Wal-Mart does. They say, you’ll make this at the lowest possible 
price. And if you then come in as Wal-Mart and say in addition to everything else you’re doing for us 
and working 24 hours a day to meet our contracts, we want you to come in and clean up your factories, 
give everyone a raise, and implement our code of conduct, it is reasonable to assume that a supplier 
would say, well, then you need to help us do that. You need to show us how to do that. You need to 
help us monitor. And as Wal-Mart promises, you have to help us implement the code.” Id. at 8:15–9:1. 
 104. Manual, supra note 32, at 48. The hearing transcript also notes that Wal-Mart helped 
monitor and implement the Standards in some factories (although not ones where Plaintiffs worked), 
and this shows “what Wal-Mart understood its own obligation to be.” Reporter’s Transcript, supra 
note 100, at 9:23–10:1. 
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consideration on the suppliers’ part in exchange for Wal-Mart’s 
additional promise to support compliance. Agreeing to comply with the 
code, being subject to audits, taking remedial actions, and accepting 
sanctions would likely be viewed as consideration for Wal-Mart’s 
contract to do business with the suppliers and not as additional 
consideration for Wal-Mart’s promise to assist with compliance. 
Therefore, it is difficult to determine whether this aspect of the Ethical 
Sourcing Program would be legally binding for lack of consideration. The 
central tenet of contract construction, that contracts are to be strictly 
construed against the drafter—especially when factors such as unequal 
sophistication and bargaining power of the parties are taken into 
consideration—may, however, make such a claim more feasible.105 
Even more importantly, plaintiffs’ third-party beneficiary claim 
against Wal-Mart as the promisor places plaintiffs in the shoes of the 
suppliers, making them the promisees. Wal-Mart raised a solid point 
when it asserted that a “supplier would never sue Wal-Mart to enforce 
their obligations vis-à-vis Wal-Mart. It just makes no sense.”106 Likewise, 
because a third-party beneficiary cannot assert greater rights than those of 
the promisee under a contract, and because it is unlikely suppliers would 
sue Wal-Mart for its failure to monitor their compliance with the 
Standards, plaintiffs would likely not succeed on a claim that the foreign 
suppliers themselves would not bring.107 The determination of whether or 
not a defendant should be liable to a third person not in privity, however, 
is  
a matter of policy and involves the balancing of various factors, among 
which are the extent to which the transaction was intended to affect the 
plaintiff, the foreseeability of harm to him, the degree of certainty that 
the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between 
the defendant’s conduct and the injury, and the policy of preventing 
future harm.108  
Thus, the Doe plaintiffs should have had privity to sue Wal-Mart because 
the Standards agreement was intended—if only indirectly—to benefit 
them, they suffered harm, and if they are not permitted to recover then 
no one will be able to do so on their behalf. Without privity, foreign 
factory workers will be left injured with no means of redress, while Wal-
Mart benefits from human exploitation and simultaneously garners 
 
 105. See, e.g., Miller v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 502 F.3d 1245, 1253 (10th Cir. 2007) (“Contra 
proferentem construes all ambiguities against the drafter.”); United States v. Kelly, 646 F. Supp. 2d 
1249, 1253 (D. Kan. 2009) (“An ambiguity will be construed against the party who drafted the 
agreement.”).  
 106. Reporter’s Transcript, supra note 100, at 27:1–2. 
 107. See Appellee’s Answering Brief, supra note 8, at 19 (citing Marina Tenants Ass’n v. Deauville 
Marina Dev. Co., 226 Cal. Rptr. 321, 327 (1986)). 
 108. Lucas v. Hamm, 364 P.2d 685 (Cal. 1961) (holding that where a will did not reach its intended 
beneficiaries due to draftsman error, privity for a tort or third-party beneficiary claim was appropriate 
to provide reprieve for heirs who would otherwise have no interest). 
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positive public attention from a code of conduct that is merely window 
dressing for human rights abuse. 
Conversely, the court in Noel v. Pizza Hut relied on principles of 
equity to hold that where “the promisee of the third-party agreement is 
responsible for the breach, jointly or alone, there is no legal theory that 
protects the promisee from liability for the breach.”109 In this way, Wal-
Mart need not have made a promise to assist with Standards compliance. 
Instead, liability results from Wal-Mart causing the suppliers’ breach by 
making compliance impossible through unreasonable production 
schedules or prices or failures to assist with compliance. Plaintiffs alleged 
that Wal-Mart’s “unreasonable time requirements and refusal to pay fair 
and reasonable prices for manufactured goods” contributed to the 
suppliers’ inability to pay plaintiffs fair wages and benefits, provide 
adequate working conditions, and comply with labor laws.110 Indeed, 
certain plaintiffs were informed by their supervisors that since Wal-Mart 
was paying such low prices for merchandise, the supplier was forced to pay 
workers less.111 
This theory, however, has been criticized. The Washington Legal 
Foundation and Allied Education Foundation penned an amicus brief 
dismissing any relationship between Wal-Mart’s contract demands and 
the suppliers’ factory conditions:  
[I]f Wal-Mart’s offered terms are “too low” to make the contract 
profitable, then the supplier is free to decline the offer. . . . [and] any 
harm to [plaintiffs] stems directly and exclusively from the supplier’s 
voluntary decision on how best to operate its business, not from 
anything attributable to Wal-Mart’s conduct.112  
This argument, however, fails to take into account Wal-Mart’s behemoth 
stature in the global marketplace. As the largest retailer in the world, Wal-
Mart can force deflated contract prices on its vendors that affect the 
broader market and impact contract prices for manufacturers with which it 
does not even do business. Moreover, Wal-Mart may be the best or only 
game in town, leaving foreign suppliers with little to no leverage when 
negotiating their contracts. When resources are consolidated so heavily in 
one entity, a “race to the bottom” is often inevitable. 
 
 109. 805 P.2d 1244, 1251 (Kan. Ct. App. 1991). A corporation made an agreement with third-party 
beneficiaries allowing them to sell their stock in the open market, but it made a subsequent agreement 
with a franchisor that abrogated their right to sell the stock. Id. at 1250–51. The court reversed the 
dismissal for failure to state a claim because there were sufficient facts to show the corporation owed a 
duty to the beneficiaries and there was no absolute prohibition against a third-party beneficiary suing 
the promisee of a third-party agreement. Id. 
 110. Complaint, supra note 2, at 43. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Brief of Washington Legal Foundation and Allied Educational Foundation as Amici Curiae 
in Support of Appellee, Urging Affirmance at 9, Doe v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677 (9th Cir. 
2009) (No. 08-55706) [hereinafter WLF & AEF Brief]. 
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VI.  Negligent Undertaking Tort Claim 
The Ninth Circuit dismissed plaintiffs’ negligent undertaking claim 
because Wal-Mart did not undertake any obligation to protect its foreign 
suppliers’ workers.113 Because Wal-Mart merely reserved the right to 
audit supplier factories, any inspections performed were gratuitous and 
did not impose a duty on Wal-Mart to use reasonable care in protecting 
plaintiffs.114 
Under the negligent undertaking duty of care, once an individual 
undertakes to assist another, he assumes a duty to use reasonable care in 
doing so.115 Significantly, this Good Samaritan doctrine does not require 
the existence of a contract or a request for a duty to be imposed. Section 
324A of the Second Restatement of Torts notes that an actor who 
undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to 
another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of a 
third person or his things, is subject to liability to the third person for 
physical harm resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to 
protect his undertaking, if (a) his failure to exercise reasonable care 
increases the risk of such harm, or (b) he has undertaken to perform a 
duty owed by the other to the third person, or (c) the harm is suffered 
because of reliance of the other or the third person upon the 
undertaking.116 
As noted above, Wal-Mart’s statements to the public regarding its 
goals to improve factory conditions, mandatory supplier assent to the 
Standards, and placement of this code of conduct in factories for foreign 
workers to see, seemingly demonstrated Wal-Mart’s intent to benefit its 
foreign suppliers’ workers—even if this aim was also beneficial to Wal-
Mart. A negligent undertaking tort claim does not require a contractual 
relationship between the parties; instead, there need only be an 
assumption of the duty to aid that is demonstrated through a party’s intent. 
Wal-Mart’s increased efforts to aid foreign workers and its highly 
publicized initiatives, such as the Supplier Development Program, only 
strengthen the argument that Wal-Mart intended to benefit foreign 
workers following the Doe suit. 
Because Wal-Mart assumed the duty to be “reasonably careful when 
contracting with suppliers to prevent international labor violations by 
those suppliers,” Wal-Mart was obligated to exercise due care in 
monitoring the factories—which plaintiffs asserted it failed to do.117 On 
 
 113. Doe v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 684 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 114. Id. 
 115. Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 323, 324, 324A (1965). 
 116. Id. § 324A (emphasis added). 
 117. Doe v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. CV 05-7307 AG (MANx), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98102, at 
*14 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2007). Moreover, Plaintiffs assert that Wal-Mart knows its auditing process can 
often be the main enforcement mechanism of ethical labor standards because labor laws are not 
routinely enforced in many of the countries in which Wal-Mart’s suppliers have factories. See 
Complaint, supra note 2, at 19. 
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the contrary, Wal-Mart demanded low prices and quick turnarounds that 
necessarily resulted in sweatshop conditions.118 Further, in holding itself 
out as requiring ethical sourcing in its factories, Wal-Mart disincentivized 
other aid programs (labor activists, human rights groups, consumer groups, 
and non-governmental organizations) from assisting plaintiffs and similarly 
situated workers because such groups assumed Wal-Mart had already 
addressed human rights issues in its suppliers’ factories.119 Consequently, 
because Wal-Mart effectively “waived off the ambulance,” foreign workers 
were worse off than they would have been had Wal-Mart not undertaken 
to benefit them.120 
Wal-Mart responded to this allegation with the argument that it 
merely reserved the right to inspect and monitor foreign supplier 
facilities and did not specifically undertake to benefit plaintiffs.121 This 
“absence of a clear, express, active undertaking” by Wal-Mart precludes 
any such claim by Plaintiffs.122 Indeed, courts have been reluctant to 
consider Good Samaritan liability unless the defendant specifically 
undertook “to perform the task that [it] is charged with having performed 
negligently.”123 The Pacific Legal Foundation reiterated this point in an 
amicus brief, highlighting the fact that Wal-Mart’s conduct did not 
exacerbate plaintiffs’ injuries: 
[Plaintiffs] do not allege that (1) they would not have worked for Wal-
Mart suppliers had they known that Wal-Mart would not reasonably 
enforce the Standards; (2) Wal-Mart’s purported halfhearted 
enforcement of the Standards made its suppliers more likely to harm 
[plaintiffs] than if the Standards has never been promulgated; (3) Wal-
Mart has assumed any duty owed by its suppliers to [plaintiffs]; or 
(4) other entities were discouraged from policing Wal-Mart’s suppliers 
and would have been successful in such policing had Wal-Mart not 
announced its intent to enforce the Standards.124 
 
 118. The Doe plaintiffs allegedly suffered forced overtime without pay, were not paid minimum 
wage, had pay withheld by their employers, were not allowed to take holidays off or given legally 
required rest periods or bathroom breaks, were refused benefits, were exposed to unsanitary 
conditions and environmental hazards, and were subjected to physical violence. See Complaint, supra 
note 2, at 20–31. 
 119. Reporter’s Transcript, supra note 100, at 18:12–20. 
 120. Id. at 19:5. In response, Wal-Mart asserted that Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that “by virtue 
of [Wal-Mart’s] acts . . . the situation got worse.” Id. at 29:5–6. 
 121. Appellee’s Answering Brief, supra note 8, at 33. 
 122. Id. at 34. 
 123. Patentas v. United States, 687 F.2d 707, 716 (3d Cir. 1982); see Sheridan v. NGK Metals Corp., 
609 F.3d 239, 263 (3d. Cir. 2010); Evans v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 398 F.2d 665, 667 (3d Cir. 1968).  
 124. Brief Amicus Curiae of Pacific Legal Foundation in Support of Appellee Wal-Mart Stores, 
Inc. and Affirmance at 14, Doe v. Wal-Mart, No. CV 05-7307 AG (MANx), 2007 U.S. Dist LEXIS 
98102 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2007) (No. 08-55706) (footnote omitted). The brief goes on to conclude:  
  Wal-Mart’s purportedly mediocre enforcement of the Standards would have done nothing 
but improve, however marginally, the Appellants’ treatment. For Wal-Mart had no duty 
outside of the Standards to inspect its suppliers’ factories, and the suppliers’ knowledge that 
they might be inspected perhaps just once a year (i.e., ineffective enforcement of the 
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The Doe trial court feared the floodgates would open if it did not 
dismiss plaintiffs’ third-party claim for negligent undertaking: All 
businesses would “be responsible for the employment conditions for their 
own workers and all the workers employed by their suppliers.”125 The 
court, however, may have overstated the claim’s “broad implications.”126 
Instead of applying to all businesses, only those that “assumed a duty of 
care would be potentially liable” for their suppliers’ workers—such as 
those that put forth codes of conduct and publicize their measures to 
improve foreign working conditions.127 Moreover, liability would be limited 
to the “specific duties assumed and triggered only when the defendant 
negligently carried out its assumed responsibilities.”128 In this respect, Wal-
Mart would be solely liable for failing to monitor its suppliers’ factories 
and condoning the human rights violations at factories from which it 
sourced merchandise. 
Furthermore, it is unsettled whether a Good Samaritan must have 
actually increased the risk in order to be held liable:  
Clear authority is lacking, but it is possible that a court may hold that 
one who has thrown rope to a drowning man, pulled him half way to 
shore, and then unreasonably abandoned the effort and left him to 
drown, is liable even though there were no other possible sources of 
aid, and the situation is made no worse than it was.129  
Utilizing this approach, Wal-Mart could be held liable for even a nod in 
the direction of improving supplier factory conditions, where human 
rights violations have long been commonplace and would continue 
absent further intervention by Wal-Mart. Because Good Samaritan 
liability—especially in this extreme form—discourages corporations from 
making voluntary attempts to improve conditions, this may not be the 
most desirable cause of action to sustain in order to affect necessary 
change. 
 
Standards) surely would encourage better conduct on their part than if no inspection were 
ever to occur.  
Id. at 15. 
 125. Doe v. Wal-Mart, No. CV 05-7307 AG (MANx), 2007 U.S. Dist LEXIS 98102, at *15 (C.D. 
Cal. Mar. 30, 2007). Defendant Wal-Mart also remarked that finding liability in relationships that are 
“several steps removed” (for example, like that between Wal-Mart and its foreign suppliers’ workers) 
would result in “terrible, terrible liability where it’s really not appropriate.” Reporter’s Transcript, 
supra note 100, at 28:23–29:2. The Washington Legal Foundation and Allied Educational Foundation’s 
amici brief further detailed the harrowing results of ascribing liability to Wal-Mart: The costs of 
international trade would increase, consequently increasing the price of goods for American 
consumers with “little or no corresponding benefit to foreign workers, many of whom would lose their 
jobs because of decreased trade.” WLF & AEF Brief, supra note 112, at 5. Such a dire forecast is of 
course relative to the substandard conditions that foreign workers currently endure. 
 126. Doe, 2007 U.S. Dist LEXIS 98102, at *15. 
 127. Phillips & Lim, supra note 102, at 353. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 323 cmt.e (1965). 
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VII.  The Last Resort: An International Treaty 
While the Doe plaintiffs had a genuine injury, it is unclear whether a 
third-party beneficiary contract claim or a negligent undertaking tort claim 
can provide redress in the future for similarly situated plaintiffs. Future 
plaintiffs’ only alternative may be to rely on international treaties 
mandating ethical labor practices. 
The Doe plaintiffs pursued this avenue by invoking international 
agreements in their complaint. To bring their suit, the foreign plaintiffs 
relied on the Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”), which allows foreign litigants 
to seek damages in U.S. courts for crimes against the law of nations.130 
Plaintiffs alleged the working conditions imposed by Wal-Mart to be in 
violation of several anti-slavery and forced labor treaties.131 
Virginia A. Leary’s declaration in support of plaintiffs’ claims noted 
that the United States has long condemned forced labor both at home 
and abroad.132 Indeed, the United States is active in the International 
Labor Office (“ILO”), a specialized agency of the United Nations, and 
serves on its governing body.133 The ILO has adopted “the two most 
widely ratified treaties on forced labor: Conventions Nos. 29 and 105.”134 
ILO Convention Number 29 has been ratified by more than 145 nations, 
and Number 105 by more than 130 nations.135 This widespread 
prohibition of forced labor in treaties can “be taken as evidence of a 
customary international norm for states which have not ratified the 
relevant conventions.”136 Even though the United States has not 
specifically ratified Convention Number 29 on the abolition of forced 
labor,137 it has “demonstrated its acceptance of the norm prohibiting 
forced labor” through its ratification of Convention Number 105 and 
 
 130. “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort 
only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1350 
(2006). Law of nations (jus gentium) is the natural reason of all men also observed among all nations. 
See jus gentium, Encyclopædia Britannica, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/308654/jus-
gentium (last visited July 1, 2012). Today, it is used to describe the system of rules governing 
interactions by different nations in public international law. See id.  
 131. These include the Protocol Amending the Slavery Convention, the Supplementary 
Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, International Labour Organisation Convention No. 29 
Concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour, International Labour Organisation Convention No. 105 
Concerning the Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, and the Slavery Convention. Complaint, 
supra note 2, at 53. 
 132. Declaration of Virginia A. Leary and Exhibits in Support of Plaintiffs’ Opposition to 
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss First Amended Complaint, Doe v. Wal-Mart, No. CV 05-7307 AG 
(MANx), 2007 U.S. Dist LEXIS 98102 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2007). 
 133. Id. at 2. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. at 3. 
 136. Id. 
 137. The United States has not ratified ILO Convention Number 29 because it would require 
extensive revisions of existing state and federal laws that directly conflict with the Convention. U.S. 
Council for Int’l Bus., Issue Analysis: U.S. Ratification of ILO Core Labor Standards 2 (2007). 
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other anti-slavery treaties as well as participation with bodies (such as the 
ILO) that condemn such practices.138 Moreover, forced labor is 
“unequivocally considered a violation of a peremptory norm . . . of 
international law, meaning again one from which no state can deviate, 
regardless of whether the state has or has not ratified a particular 
international instrument against its prohibition.”139 Finally, the United 
States has also implemented national legislation prohibiting forced labor140 
and participates in the non-binding Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development’s “Guidelines for Multinational 
Corporations” that encourages participants to observe a set of principles 
for responsible business conduct—including adequate compensation and 
the elimination of forced labor—wherever they operate.141 
The trial court in Doe similarly rejected application of the ATS 
because plaintiffs failed to provide authoritative support for the claim 
that the suppliers’ treatment of workers was equivalent to the “limited 
and heinous conduct found actionable under the ATS.”142 The broad 
implications of plaintiffs’ ATS claim would permit a federal suit 
whenever an employee was denied pay while living in “difficult economic 
circumstances,” and although the court was “sympathetic to the plight of 
Plaintiffs, the ATS is not the appropriate avenue for relief.”143 For this 
reason, on appeal plaintiffs ultimately abandoned the ATS federal claim, 
which was the only means of raising international law violations in U.S. 
courts.144 
Plaintiffs faced an uphill battle from the start, considering that no 
U.S. court has recognized international labor standards as binding 
international law.145 However, there is a trend to interpret the ATS more 
 
 138. Declaration of Virginia A. Leary, supra note 132, at 4. 
 139. Id. at 6; see also Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 53, Jan. 27, 1980, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 332, (“[A] peremptory norm . . . is a norm accepted and recognized by the international 
community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be 
modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character.”). It 
remains unsettled whether preemptory norms are binding on U.S. courts with respect to domestic law, 
or only with regard to international law. See United States v. Matta-Ballesteros, 71 F.3d 754, 764 n.5 
(9th Cir.1995) (“Kidnapping . . . does not qualify as a jus cogens norm, such that its commission would 
be jusiticiable in our courts even absent a domestic law. Jus cogens norms, which are non-derogable 
and peremptory, enjoy the highest status within customary international law, are binding on all 
nations, and can not be preempted by treaty.”). 
 140. The Generalized System of Preferences Act of 1984, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2461–67 (2006), requires the 
inclusion of the prohibition of any form of compulsory labor in governmental reporting on the status 
of “internationally recognized” worker rights. See Declaration of Virginia A. Leary, supra note 132, 
at 5. 
 141. OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (2008). 
 142. Doe v. Wal-Mart, No. CV 05-7307 AG (MANx), 2007 U.S. Dist LEXIS 98102, at *21 (C.D. 
Cal. Mar. 30, 2007). 
 143. Id. 
 144. Appellee’s Answering Brief, supra note 8, at 7. 
 145. Kenny, supra note 77, at 468. 
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expansively, and scholars theorize that future courts may be willing to 
view the core set of labor rights publicized in corporate codes of conduct 
as a binding international norm based on their general recognition and 
acceptance throughout the world.146 
Conclusion 
Ultimately, due to the confines and interpretations of present law, 
both the trial and appellate courts properly dismissed the claims against 
Wal-Mart. Corporate codes of conduct are self-imposed, self-regulated, 
and voluntary, and therefore lack a definitive enforcement mechanism. 
There is no separate standard for deep-pocketed mega-corporations, 
even if a sense of morality tells us there ought to be. Based on current 
law, Wal-Mart is neither legally obligated to use its vast market share to 
improve the conditions of every community in which it operates or 
sources products, nor can it be held liable for not leveraging its economic 
power over other countries to improve conditions to a U.S. standard. The 
Ninth Circuit ultimately agreed with Wal-Mart’s assertion that a verdict 
in Plaintiffs’ favor would 
discourage American companies from undertaking voluntary efforts to 
improve employment conditions at the overseas factories of their 
foreign suppliers. Voluntary efforts at improving conditions in foreign 
countries should not make American companies the guarantors of the 
overseas working conditions they seek to improve nor should it subject 
them to class action litigation and liability in the courts of the United 
States.147 
The case, however, raises significant ethical issues that must be 
addressed as corporate paternalism takes hold and corporations function 
more and more like governments. A 2007 study at two Taiwanese and two 
Korean suppliers for Nike found that more than two-thirds of workers 
(67.1%) either “agreed” or “strongly agreed” that code of conduct 
compliance resulted from Nike’s efforts and not from the efforts of either 
the management (53.2%) or unions (38.2%).148 Considering this significant 
power, should the principles of capitalism take a back seat where basic 
human rights are concerned? 
A. False Advertising Versus First Amendment Protected Speech 
 That corporate behemoths can establish codes of conduct that 
have no efficacy is discomforting: They are a boon for public relations 
and corporate image but create no real obligation on the corporation to 
 
 146. See, e.g., Jane C. Hong, Enforcement of Corporate Codes of Conduct: Finding a Private Right 
of Action for International Laborers Against MNCs for Labor Rights Violations, 19 Wis. Int’l L.J. 41, 
68 (2000). 
 147. Appellee’s Answering Brief, supra note 8, at 2.  
 148. Phillips & Lim, supra note 102, at 348. 
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abide by or enforce them. These empty claims, however, could amount to 
false advertising on the part of the corporation. Plaintiffs raised this issue 
in their complaint, stating that Wal-Mart had aggressively advertised in 
California that it had a code of conduct, complied with labor regulations, 
and treated workers well.149 Plaintiffs alleged that these statements were 
knowingly made even though they were false and induced consumers to 
believe that Wal-Mart’s products were made under lawful conditions.150 
Moreover, such false advertising has “counteracted any consumer 
pressure on Wal-Mart to actually improve the conditions of its supplier 
factories and actually require its suppliers to comply with the Code of 
Conduct.”151 Plaintiffs asserted that Wal-Mart’s claims amount to unfair 
business practices under UCL 17200,152 defined as “unlawful, unfair or 
fraudulent business act or practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or 
misleading advertising.”153 
The Washington Legal Foundation’s amicus brief disregarded the 
UCL claims. It argued that Wal-Mart’s speech regarding its practices 
abroad is protected by the First Amendment.154 Regardless of whether 
the speech is classified as “commercial”—and thus subject to lesser 
protection due to government regulation designed to protect consumers 
engaging in commercial transactions—the “overseas labor practices of 
large American corporations is an issue of major public importance” and 
thus entitled to full First Amendment protection.155 Consequently, the 
Washington Legal Foundation argued that plaintiffs failed to state a 
claim for relief under the UCL because the UCL does not authorize 
compensatory damages,156 and the First Amendment prohibits prior 
restraints on fully protected speech.157 Indeed, the Washington Legal 
Foundation perhaps best summarized the issue: “The appropriate 
response by those who believe that Wal-Mart’s speech has been false is 
to engage in counter-speech of their own, not to attempt to silence Wal-
Mart.”158 
 
 149. Complaint, supra note 2, at 49. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. at 2. 
 153. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 (West 2011). 
 154. Brief of Washington Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae in Support of Wal-Mart’s Motion to 
Dismiss First Amended Complaint at 5, Doe v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. CV 05-7303 GPS (MANx), 
2007 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 98102 (C.D. Cal. May 4, 2006) [hereinafter WLF Brief]. 
 155. Id. 
 156. The UCL only provides for restitution and injunctive relief. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17203.  
 157. WLF Brief, supra note 154, at 6. 
 158. Id. at 17; see also Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“If in 
the long run the beliefs expressed in proletarian dictatorship are destined to be accepted by the 
dominant forces of the community, the only meaning of free speech is that they should be given their 
chance and have their way.”). 
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On this point the trial court agreed, noting first that such a claim 
based on conduct occurring in foreign factories is beyond the reach of the 
statute.159 Even when viewed with regard to the California plaintiffs 
originally included in the suit, in order to have standing, the UCL 
requires a plaintiff to have “suffered injury in fact and . . . lost money or 
property as a result of the unfair competition.”160 The court held that the 
California plaintiffs—who did not even claim to be consumers of Wal-
Mart’s products—did not meet this burden with their claim to have “lost 
money as a result of the independent actions of their employers, who 
were influenced by [Wal-Mart’s] actions.161 This is not the type of injury 
that occurs ‘as a result of’ false or deceptive advertising.”162 The plaintiffs 
dropped their UCL claim on appeal,163 underscoring the fact that this 
cause of action is better left to consumers. 
B. Legislation 
While Wal-Mart’s publicity campaign is morally repugnant, false 
advertising claims are unlikely to hold water in suits going forward. 
Instead, we must look to other means of flushing out “free riders who 
advertise a code without incurring enforcement costs.”164 Lawsuits—even if 
unsuccessful—hit a corporation where it hurts most, in the court of public 
opinion, because they inform the public of a business’s actual practices 
beyond the corporate propaganda.165 Legislation, however, may ultimately 
be the most direct way to encourage changes in corporate behavior, in a 
similar manner to the way in which the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines 
incentivized corporate ethics programs and codes of conduct in the first 
place.166 Moreover, there is ample precedent for the successful application 
of such legislation. The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act makes U.S. 
companies liable for bribes in foreign countries.167 States, including 
California, have taken the matter into their own hands and approved 
 
 159. Doe v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. CV 05-7303 GPS (MANx), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98102, 
at *18 (C.D. Cal. 2007). 
 160. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17204. 
 161. Doe, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98102, at *18 
 162. Id. 
 163. Appellee’s Answering Brief, supra note 8, at 7. 
 164. Phillips & Lim, supra note 102, at 378. 
 165. Yet this comes at a high price for plaintiffs who typically do not have the means to take on the 
formidable legal teams of multi-national corporations.  
 166. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, supra note 55. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines were 
enacted partly to establish a clear corporate crime sentencing and enforcement policy. By defining a 
model for good corporate citizenship, the guidelines created financial incentives for companies to take 
crime controlling actions. See Dove Izraeli & Mark S. Schwartz, What Can We Learn from the U.S. 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines for Organizational Ethics?, 17 J. Bus. Ethics 1045, 1045–46 (1998). 
 167. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2 (2010). 
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ordinances to prevent labor violations abroad.168 The Clinton 
Administration’s Apparel Industry Partnership—the same one Kathie Lee 
Gifford joined in the wake of her Wal-Mart clothing scandal—pushed 
clothing manufacturers to higher social standards in their overseas 
factories.169 
Legislation could be the most effective approach because it is 
“proactive rather than reactionary and gives corporations, local businesses, 
and politicians an opportunity to win public favor.”170 Wal-Mart itself even 
implied the effectiveness of legislation when it cited the Trade Promotion 
Act of 2002 as a “conscious congressional balance between promoting 
improved foreign labor practices and respecting the sovereignty of foreign 
nations in relation to their domestic matters.”171 This is convenient 
rhetoric, however, considering Wal-Mart cited the Trade Promotion Act to 
counter plaintiffs’ reliance on the ATS to invoke several treaties that 
condemned forced labor practices. 
While holding companies liable for their claims may initially stymie 
voluntary corporate efforts to improve conditions abroad, pressure from 
consumers that affects the bottom line should compensate for this shift.172 
The need to appease shareholders and increase sales will force 
companies to overcome the conflict “between striving to set a higher 
standard for human and labor rights, and the criticism [they] will face for 
falling short of that higher standard.”173 Ultimately, a rising tide lifts all 
boats, and holding U.S. corporations accountable for all aspects of their 
supply chain—including the ethical treatment of foreign suppliers’ 
workers—can only have a positive impact around the world. Where the 
law may lag behind, consumers and governments will need to take up the 
cause by proposing aggressive legislation founded on a sense of equity to 
ensure that foreign injustices do not go unnoticed. 
 
 
 168. The California Transparency in Supply Chains Act of 2010 (SB 657) went into effect in 
January 2012 and requires large retailers and manufacturers doing business in California to disclose 
efforts to eradicate slavery and human trafficking from its supply chain. Cal. Civ. Code § 1714.43 
(2011); see also Corporate Disclosure in Compliance with SB657 California Transparency in 
Supply Chains Act (Human Trafficking and Anti-Slavery) (2011). 
 169. See U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Apparel Industry Partnership’s Agreement (Apr. 14, 1997), available 
at http://actrav.itcilo.org/actrav-english/telearn/global/ilo/guide/apparell.htm. 
 170. Kenny, supra note 77, at 471. 
 171. Appellee’s Answering Brief, supra note 8, at 48. 
 172. Consumers care about corporate social responsibility because “they want to pass on a better 
world to their children, and many want their purchasing to reflect their values.” Archie B. Carroll & 
Kareem M. Shabana, The Business Case for Corporate Social Responsibility: A Review of Concepts, 
Research and Practice, 12 Int’l J. Mgmt. Rev. 85, 92 (2010). There is also evidence that a positive link 
of corporate social responsibility to consumer patronage is spurring companies to devote greater 
resources to such initiatives. See id. at 98. 
 173. Ryan P. Tofloy, Now Playing: Corporate Codes of Conduct in the Global Theater, 15 Ariz. J. 
Int’l & Comp. L. 905, 917 (1998). 
